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WITH THE RECENT OGDEN RATE CHANGE STILL IN MIND,  THIS UPDATE INVESTIGATES SOME OF 
THE CHALLENGES THAT PERIODIC PAYMENT ORDERS (PPO S)  BRING TO INSURERS .  
These difficulties often lead capital 
actuaries to apply the standard 
formula stress scenario for 
longevity. A reduction of mortality 
rates of 20% pa may be meaningful 
for a book of pension annuities but it 
is less so here where the size of the 
pool is so small. 
A key concept to improving the 
capital efficiency under Solvency II is 
to increase the diversification of 
longevity risk by increasing the pool 
size. This is one of the main drivers 
behind insurers interested in 
consolidating PPOs into a single 
fund. 
Figure 1 highlights the impact to the 
longevity risk capital by having a 
larger pool of PPO holders in your 
fund. 
Column (4) suggests that a 
reduction of 14% in technical 
provision by way of the number of 
PPOs in the fund increasing from a 
pool of 10 moving up to 50. Similarly 
moving from a pool of 50 lives to 100 
has a similar further effect. 
A fundamental difficulty with PPOs is that the risks they 
pose are pertinent to each individual PPO holder. 
Longevity is an example of this. Traditional annuity 
reserving techniques rely on large pools of lives to allow 
standard mortality tables and generic assumptions to be 
used. PPOs are few by nature but large by individual size 
hence pooling does not really exist. 
Reliance then tends to therefore focus on the medical 
assessment of an individual life. Medical reports required 
for life expectancy measurement are often required 
throughout the compensation claim process. Much of this 
is useful to insurance medical underwriters in their own 
assessment of future life expectancy of the claimant. 
This information is often used to generate the longevity 
assumptions for reserving purposes however it does not 
help the insurer to understand all the risk associated with 
longevity. In particular the risk of mis-estimation by the 
medical underwriting on an individual life (the 
‘misestimation risk’), risks around the estimation of the 
future improvements for these lives (the ‘trend risk’), and 
the generic random risk around such small sample sizes 
(the ‘stochastic risk). 
The building of a longevity risk model is in itself a complex 
exercise. However, even if the insurer achieves this, 
calibration of the model is often difficult as the PPO 
market is relatively new and therefore experience studies 
are of very limited use.  
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The last couple years have 
seen the incidence of new 
PPOs granted by the courts 
fall. This has lessened, 
somewhat, the focus of the 
motor insurers on the 
challenges that PPOs bring to 
them. Even at this low current 
incidence, due to the life 
expectancy of the individuals 
affected often being well over 
30 years, general insurers are 
seeing their balance sheets 
gradually increasing their 
exposure to a small number of 
significant longevity risks. 
The reserving of these high 
value life risks is notoriously 
difficult to perform, and 
relatively small assumption 
differences can lead to large 
changes in technical 
provisions due to the expected 
long duration of the PPOs. 
Reinsurance will attempt to 
reduce the risk exposure but 
sometimes this doesn’t always 
extinguish longevity risk fully. 
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 PPOs have been 
gradually accumulating 
on non-life insurers 
balance sheets over the 
last ten or so years. 
Recent years have seen 
fewer new PPOs 
however this 
accumulation of longevity 
risk is likely to continue 
for a significant period of 
time. Are the motor 
insurers ready? 
 
PPOs have been quietly 
accumulating on the 
balance sheets of motor 
insurers over the last ten 
years. 
 
Recently motor insurers 
have been less 
concerned as a result 
generally lower volume of 
new PPOs written. 
However with the Ogden 
rate now updated it is 
likely that focus will 
switch back to addressing 
their PPO risks. 
 
“…of the projected 1.7 
million frontline care 
workers in the UK in 2020 
we estimate that between 
51-64% will be directly 
affected by the raising of 
the pay floor (due to the 
paying of the National 
Living Wage) for over-
24s, equivalent to a pay 
rise for between 850,000 
and 1 million workers.” 
Resolution Foundation 
Wage Inflation 
Another assumption that can 
cause large fluctuations in the 
technical provisions held by 
insurers is the estimate of 
future care costs inflation. 
Usually the court requires 
PPOs to increase in line with 
the ONS index of care workers’ 
salaries (often referred to as 
the ASHE 6115 index). 
The difficulty is that there is no 
simple asset hedge for care 
workers wage inflation. Figure 
2 highlights a comparison of 
RPI versus care wage inflation 
over the last 15 years. Simple 
correlation between the two is 
not as strong as what might be 
presumed. Currently implied 
30-year RPI is around 3.25%. 
What should an ASHE based 
care costs inflation be? 
It is believed that a significant 
proportion of the difference 
between the RPI and care 
worker wage inflation is due to 
the uncertainty driven by 
politics. Wage growth is often 
heavily influenced by 
government policy - for 
instance the focus on austerity 
during the period 2010 to 2015 
appears to have the slowed 
care sector wage growth.  
Nationally there appears to be 
growing pressure to adopt the 
‘National Living Wage’ and it is 
likely it will impact a large 





















Figure 2. Annual Change in RPI and ASHE 6115 
Annual RPI Annual  ASHE (90%)
The Resolution Foundation 
predicts the impact of adopting 
the living wage could materially 
increase salaries for one million 
care workers. 
Political risk is very difficult to 
hedge in its own right as the 
changes and subsequent impacts 
are difficult to predict over the 
short term let alone the longer 
term. Often the future time period 
of assessment is more than 40 
years which means relatively 
small variations in this 
assumption can result in very 
large differences over to the 
overall cost. Analysis suggest that 
this assumption may bring with it 
the largest exposure to balance 
sheet volatility for the insurer.  
In the absence of a natural hedge 
for wage inflation risk it is 
common practice for actuaries will 
try to base an assumption around 
RPI as there is at least RPI bonds 
available, or if equities are the 
preferred investment strategy, 
then dividend growth is often 
thought to be a reasonable match 
to RPI.  
This doesn’t account for the 
additional risk of matching to 
ASHE. This risk is very difficult to 
mitigate. Some insurers have 
taken the prudent step to assume 
that care worker wage inflation is 
1.5% higher than RPI per annum. 
With so much uncertainty around 
this risk it does feel appropriate to 
assume a figure higher than RPI. 
Ogden Change 
Last week it was announced that 
the Ogden ‘discount rate’ would 
be moved from the current minus 
0.75% to minus 0.25%. This is an 
increase of 0.5% since the last 
announcement in 2017. 
The higher Ogden rate is likely to 
mean that lump sum settlements 
will reduce by between 10%-20% 
depending on the age (and future 
life expectancy) of the PPO 
holder. It is unlikely that we will 
see a large increase in the 
propensity to seek PPOs rather 
than lump sums as PPOs will 
continue to be viewed as more 
expensive than lump sums 
although there may be some.  
Is the Ogden rate change fair to 
insurers? The Ministry of Justice 
announced in 2018 that the 
assumed risk profile of the 
claimant would be moved from 
very low risk to low risk. The MoJ 
consulted on the approach that 
should be used to ascertain an 
appropriate asset allocation for 
claimants. 
The effect of this methodology 
change is that the Ogden rate 
increases by around 0.75%. This 
is at the top end of the range that 
IFAs would plan for their client. 
On paper it feels like a fair 
outcome for insurers. It may have 
been that insurers were 
predicting a larger increase, but 
gilt yields have fallen since 2017 
and not increased as they had 
hoped. Time will tell. 
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